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COMMENT
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES:
EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION
CAMPAIGN ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1976
The number of political action committees and the amount of their contri-
butions to political campaigns have recently experienced substantial growth.
On March 28, 1976, in a prescient article entitled "Business Builds Its
Political War Chest-Legally," The New York Times reported:
What began as a slow but steady stream of corporate "political
action committees"-formed last year following a landmark ruling
by the Federal Election Commission-is turning into a torrent.
American business and professional groups, already sitting on
top of a $9 million political war chest, are rushing to form new
committees which aim to raise additional millions of dollars for this
year's Presidential and Congressional candidates.
At least 100 new corporate committees were registered with the
election commission in the first 10 weeks of 1976, virtually equal-
ing the number of such committees established during all of 1975.1
A study released on February 14, 1977 by Common Cause, the public
affairs lobby, stated that from 1974 to 1976, the number of corporate politi-
cal action committees registered with the Federal Election Commission rose
from 100 to about 450.2 Just as dramatically, contributions from business
and professional groups to congressional candidates rose from $2.5 million
in 1974 to $7.1 million in 1976, an increase of 184%.3
1. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1976, § 2, at 2, col. 1.
2. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, § 1, at I, col. 4. There are several reasons why cor-
porations are only now establishing political action committee (PAC) funds in any
great number while labor organizations have had functioning PAC's since the 1940's.
Pragmatically, corporations have recognized PAC funds as convenient, legal vehicles
to influence both elections and legislation, as well as to counterbalance the impact of
labor organizations and other special interest groups. See, e.g., Wall St. J., May 20,
1976, at 1, col. 6, & 37, col. 3-4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1975, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Wash.
Post, Nov. 19, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 7. Further, uncertainty about the legality of cor-
porate PAC's was quelled to some extent first by the passage of the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 103, 88 Stat. 1272 (1974),
(current version at 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (Cum. Supp. 1977), and later by the Federal
Election Commission's Sun Oil advisory opinion. F.E.C. Advisory Opinion 1975-23,
40 Fed. Reg. 56,584 (1975).
3. N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1977, § 1, at 1, col. 4. Contributions to congressional
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Because political action committees (PAC's) are involved with federal
elections, they are subject to certain restrictions designed to assure the in-
tegrity of the federal electoral process. The Supreme Court has recently
underscored the constitutional power of Congress to regulate federal elec-
tions, 4 and pursuant to this specific constitutional authority, a series of legis-
lative enactments in the last seventy years has prohibited or controlled parti-
cular electoral activities.5 Accordingly, while recognizing the right of both
candidates from all special interest groups had risen to more than $22.5 million in 1976.
nearly twice as much as in 1974. A partial explanation for the significant increase
is that the 1976 presidential general election was for the first time financed entirely
by government funds. Consequently, the major parties' presidential nominees were pro-
hibited from accepting private contributions to defray expenses incurred in the general
election, making more special interest funds available to congressional candidates. See
I.R.C. § 9003(b).
4. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Court in Buckley was referring
to a constitutional power: "[T]he Times, Places and Manners of holding Elections
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,
except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators .... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
In 1932, Chief Justice Hughes characterized § 4 of article 1 as containing:
authority to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as
to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of vot-
ing, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting
of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of
election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure
and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the
fundamental right involved.
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). Soon after that interpretation, the Court
construed this constitutional power as extending to presidential elections. See Bur-
roughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
5. For a thorough examination of the history of federal election legislation, see
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-84 (1957); H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE
1972 ELECTION (1976); H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING THE 1968 ELECTION (1971); A.
HEARD, THE COSTS OF DEMOCRACY (1960); Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its
Aftermath, and Its Prospects: The Constitutionality of Government Restraints on Po-
litical Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327 (197.6); King, Corporate Political
Spending and the First Amendment, 23 U. PIrrT. L. REV. 847 (1962); Lambert, Corpo-
rate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1033 (1965); Redish,
Reflections on Federal Regulation of Corporate Political Activity, 21 J. PUB. L. 339
(1972); Comment, Control of Corporate and Union Political Expenditures: A Consti-
tutional Analysis, 27 FORD. L. REV. 599 (1958-59); Comment, First Amendment-Cor-
porate Freedom of Speech, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1117 (1973); Comment, Of Politics,
Pipefitters and Section 610: Union Political Contributions in Modern Context, 51 TEX.
L. REV. 936 (1973). See generally Fleishman, Freedom of Speech and Equality of
Political Opportunity: The Constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, 51 N.C.L. REV. 389 (1973); Campaign Spending Controls Under the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act of 1971, 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 285 (1972); Comment, The
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971: Reform of the Political Process?, 60 GEO. L.J.
1309 (1972); Comment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and
Union Campaign Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 148 (1974).
Catholic University Law Review
corporations and unions to establish political action committees, Congress
has also placed restrictions on corporate and union sponsored PAC's.
The most recent legislation regulating PAC operations, the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1976,6 has substantially restricted both
the class of persons a corporate PAC may solicit for contributions and the
permissible frequency of solicitation. These amendments responded pri-
marily to the Federal Election Commission's Sun Oil advisory opinion 7 and
to the Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo8 that invalidated on con-
stitutional grounds the composition of the Federal Election Commission
(FEC). However, the amendments have limited PAC operations further
than necessary to achieve the legitimate and well-established purposes of fed-
eral election legislation. Those purposes have traditionally been "to avoid
the deleterious influences on federal elections resulting from the use of money
by those who exercise control over large aggregations of capital,"9 and to pre-
vent corporate and union officials' use of general treasury funds for political
purposes without the consent of the beneficial owners.10 Collaterally, federal
legislation has sought to protect minority interests from those of corporate and
union leadership.
Those purposes constitute valid state interests which have been found suffi-
ciently compelling to justify some infringement on the first amendment rights
of expression and association. Nevertheless, certain provisions of the 1976
amendments invaded basic first amendment rights by unnecessarily and un-
justifiably limiting the scope of the audience which a corporate PAC may
solicit. With no essential change in the state interests underlying federal
election legislation, the 1976 amendments raise substantial constitutional
questions.
I. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: THE POLITICAL
ACTION COMMITTEE CODIFIED
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197111
6. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-56 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
7. F.E.C. Advisory Opinion 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584 (1975).
8. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
9. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957). See also Pipefitters Local
562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 415-16 (1972); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S.
106, 113 (1948).
10. See Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 413-14 (1972); United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113, 115 (1948); Ash v. Cort, 496 F.2d 416, 422 (3d
Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
11. Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. III, 86 Stat. 11 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (Supp.
V 1975)).
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(FECA), the statutory law regulating campaign and election activities by pri-
vate organizations was relatively simple. In response to a general feeling at
the beginning of the century that the forces of vast corporate wealth were
too great an influence on elections,' 12 Congress passed the Tillman Act of
1907,13 which prohibited contributions from corporations and national banks
in connection with federal elections. Congress intended to remove the undue
influence of corporate funds on the electoral process and, secondarily, ques-
tioned the moral right of corporate officials to make political contributions
from corporate funds without the prior approval of shareholders.' 4 The Cor-
rupt Practices Act of 192515 broadened the effects of the Tillman Act by pro-
hibiting any "contribution," not merely "money contribution," from a corpo-
12. For example, in his 1905 message to Congress, President Theodore Roosevelt
proposed that:
All contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any politi-
cal purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to
use stockholders' money for such purposes; and, moreover, a prohibition of
this kind would be, as far as it went, an effective method of stopping the
evils aimed at in corrupt practices acts [generally, ineffectual state laws re-
quiring the reporting of sources of contributions aimed at discouraging cor-
porate contributions].
40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905).
13. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907), which provided:
That it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized
by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connec-
tion with any election to any political office. It shall also be unlawful for
any corporation whatever to make a money contribution in connection with
any election at which Presidential and Vice-Presidential electors or a Repre-
sentative in Congress is to be voted for or any election by any State legislature
of a United States Senator.
14. See 40 CONG. REc. 96 (1905); 41 CONG. REC. 1451-55 (1907); Hearings Before
the House Comm. on the Election of the President, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1906).
See also United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 575 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
15. Ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925). Underscoring the same basic purpose
that prompted passage of the Tillman Act, Senator Robinson, one of the Senate leaders,
commented that:
We all know . . . that one of the great political evils of the time is the
apparent hold on political parties which business interests and certain organi-
zations seek and sometimes obtain by reason of liberal campaign contributions.
Many believe that when an individual or association of individuals makes large
contributions for the purpose of aiding candidates of political parties in win-
ning the elections, they expect, and sometimes demand, and occasionally, at
least, receive, consideration by the beneficiaries of their contributions which
not infrequently is harmful to the general public interest. It is unquestionably
an evil which ought to be dealt with, and dealt with intelligently and effec-
tively.
65 CONG. REc. 9507-08 (1924). See Lambert, supra note 5, at 1037 n.20.
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ration or national bank.1" While both the Tillman Act and the Federal Cor-
rupt Practices Act focused on the ill effects of amassed corporate wealth,
their primary intent was to curtail the general impact of aggregated wealth
on the electoral process rather than to restrict the freedoms of those in con-
trol of sizeable wealth.
In 1947, the Labor Management Relations Act 17 (the Taft-Hartley Act)
extended the existing prohibition to unions i" and made "expenditures," as
well as contributions, illegal. 19 During debate on the 1947 Act, a crucial
distinction was made between contributions or expenditures from a union's
general treasury fund and those from funds financed by voluntary donations.
The latter were unequivocally distinguished as not being statutorily pro-
hibited.20  In subsequent years, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the vital sig-
16. Section 313 of the Act was the critical portion, since it changed the 1907 pro-
hibition of "money contribution" to "contribution," which was defined to include "a
gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit, of money, or anything of value, and includes
a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or not legally enforceable, to make a contri-
bution." Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, tit. III, § 302(d), 43 Stat. 1071 (1925).
17. Ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 159 (1947). Section 313 then read, in part:
It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by au-
thority of any law of Congress, to make a contribution or expenditure in con-
nection with any election to any political office, or in connection with any
primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates
for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organi-
zation to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election
at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Represen-
tative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted
for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or cau-
cus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candi-
date, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution
prohibited by this section ...
[The additions of 1947 are italicized, and the penalty provisions are omitted.]
18. The prohibition against contributions by corporations, found in § 313 of the Fed-
eral Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, had been extended to labor organizations by the
War Labor Disputes Act of 1943, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167-68 (1943), but the
prohibition ran only until the end of World War II.
19. Congressional investigations of the 1944 and 1946 federal elections found that
because of a loophole in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, organizations were able
to avoid the prohibition against making contributions by making "expenditures," or indi-
rect contributions. As a result, unions in particular were expending large sums of
money, for example, to distribute campaign literature or to sponsor radio broadcasts
on behalf of a candidate through partisan communication with the public. The investi-
gations focused largely on the Political Action Committee of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO). See, e.g., S. REP. No. 101, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-24 (1945).
20. See 93 CONG. REc. 6437-40 (1947). Senator Taft, sponsor of the Senate labor
bill and one of the Senate conferees, stated in his floor explanation:
If [union members] are asked to contribute directly . . . to the support
of a labor political organization, they know what their money is to be used
[Vol. 26:756
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nificance of the source of funds used for campaign contributions or expendi-
tures.
2 1
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 197122 required full disclosure of
campaign expenditures and contributions in federal primary and general elec-
tions. FECA contained a radical departure from prior election legislation.
An amendment to the House version of FECA, introduced by Representative
Orval Hansen, and ultimately included in the final bill, 23 quite clearly ex-
panded the definition of a prohibited contribution or expenditure.2 4  It also
for and presumably approve it. From such contribution the organization can
spend all the money it wants to with respect to such matters. But the prohibi-
tion is against labor unions using their members' dues for political purposes,
which is exactly the same as the prohibition against a corporation using its
stockholders' money for political purposes, and perhaps in violation of the
wishes of many of its stockholders.
Id. at 6440.
21. See, e.g., Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); Machinists
v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
22. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 101, 86 Stat. 3 (1971) (current version at 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 431 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1977)). There was substantial pressure for passage of elec-
tion reform because the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 was considered so full
of loopholes that it could neither inform nor guide the public and candidates on the
election process. As one Senator remarked during debate on S. 382, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971), the Senate version of the FECA of 1971:
In fact, [it] is a sham. It is a dangerous sham because over the years it
has created an illusion of regulation of the Federal elective process. As an
illusion it has retarded meaningful reform in an area that particularly needs
reform. It has provided an easy excuse for maintaining the status quo.
117 CONG. Rac. 28,812 (1971) (remarks of Senator Prouty).
23. H.R. 11060, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., 117 CONG. REC. 43,379 (1971), amending
18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970). The amendment provided:
As used in this section, the phrase "contribution or expenditure" shall in-
clude any direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or
gift of money, or any services, or anything of value to any candidate, campaign
committee, or political party or organization, in connection with any election
to any of the offices referred to in this section; but shall not include commu-
nications by a corporation to its stockholders and their families or by a labor
organization to its members and their families on any subject; non-partisan
registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by a corporation aimed at its stock-
holders and their families, or by a labor organization aimed at its members
and their families; the establishment, administration, and solicitation of contri-
butions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political purposes by
a corporation or labor organization; provided, that it shall be unlawful for
such a fund to make a "contribution or expenditure" by utilizing money or
anything of value secured by physical force, job discrimination, financial re-
prisals, or the threat of force, job discrimination or financial reprisal; or by
dues, fees or other monies required as a condition of membership "in a labor
organization or as a condition of employment, or by monies obtained in any
commercial transaction."
24. "The effect [was] to carry out the basic intent of section 610, which is to pro-
1977]
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exempted from the definition three types of corporate or union activities:
(1) communications to shareholders or members, 25 (2) nonpartisan registra-
tion and get-out-the-vote drives, and (3) the establishment and administra-
tion of a separate segregated fund to solicit contributions for political pur-
poses. The amendment intended to clarify that, by using "separate segre-
gated funds," corporations and labor organizations could legally operate po-
litical action committees. However, the purpose and scope of the separate
segregated fund exemption was particularly ambiguous.26  Corporations were
hesitant to rely on that exemption. 27 The resulting confusion led to the Fed-
eral Election Commission's Sun Oil advisory opinion.2 8
hibit the use of union or corporate funds for active electioneering directed at the gen-
eral public on behalf of a candidate in a Federal election." 117 CONG. REc. 43,379
(1971) (remarks of Rep. Hansen).
25. Some years earlier in United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948), the Court
had distinguished between communications from a union to its members and communi-
cations aimed at the general public. The Court suggested that prohibiting publications
by corporations and unions advising their members, stockholders, or customers of dan-
gers or advantages of issues or candidates would raise grave constitutional doubts. id.
at 120-24.
26. Of the three exemptions created by the amendment, the separate segregated fund
exemption was given the least attention and considered the least imperative during de-
bate on the FECA. Interview with former Representative Orval Hansen, in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Jan. 7, 1977).
27. The litigation which arose from one corporation's establishing a PAC must have
had a particularly chilling effect. Although the 1971 Act had expressly allowed corpo-
rations to establish separate segregated funds under 18 U.S.C. § 610, it had failed to
include the same language in § 611, relating to government contractors. Consequently,
on May 15, 1972, Common Cause brought suit against TRW, a major defense con-
tractor, alleging that TRW's PAC violated § 611. Common Cause v. TRW, CA 980-72
(D.D.C. 1972). Common Cause argued that § 611 had been enacted "to prevent the
use of political contributions by those in a contractual relationship with the United
States to subtly influence the treatment afforded them by government officials." Id.
at 5. The controversy was resolved on August 9, 1975, when TRW voluntarily dis-
banded its political fund. Stipulation of Dismissal, id. The 1974 Amendments extended
the right to establish a separate segregated fund to corporations that are government
contractors. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, Title I, §§ 101(e)(2), 103,
88 Stat. 1267, 1272 (recodified at 2 U.S.C. § 441c by Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. 94-283, § 322, 90 Stat. 475, 492 (1976)).
28. F.E.C. Advisory Opinion 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584 (1975). The FECA
Amendments of 1974 created an eight-member Federal Election Commission and vested
in it primary responsibility for administering and enforcing the Act. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 437c et seq. (Supp. V 1975). The FEC is the principal repository of all reports
and statements required under the FECA, and is authorized "[t]o prescribe suitable
rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of [the Act]." 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(10)
(Supp. V. 1975).
Section 437f(a) authorizes the FEC upon request to render advisory opinions as to
whether any specific activity by the federal officeholder, candidate for federal office,
or political committee requesting the opinions was or would be in violation of the Act.
[Vol. 26:756
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The Sun Oil Company sought FEC approval of its proposed program to
use general treasury funds to establish, administer, and solicit voluntary con-
tributions to a political action committee. 29 Although the FECA of 1971 ap-
peared to permit just such an activity, questions remained about the ramifi-
cations of creating and running a PAC. Sun Oil, therefore, sought clarifica-
tion of the operating procedures for a corporate PAC. In a divided opinion,
the FEC appeared to resolve doubts in five areas: (1) general treasury funds
can be expended in establishing, administering, and soliciting contributions
to the PAC if it is maintained as a separate segregated fund, (2) the com-
pany can make -political contributions in federal elections if they are made
solely from PAC funds which have been obtained voluntarily, (3) the com-
pany can control the disbursements of funds from its separate segregated
fund, (4) the company can solicit contributions from its shareholders and em-
ployees, and (5) the company can accept contributions to its PAC from any
source that would not otherwise be unlawful.
3 0
The corporate community was most pleased with the opinion,31 particularly
because it allowed solicitation of all employees, including hourly wage em-
ployees. But labor spokesmen and some congressional Democrats were not
pleased. They expressed concern about the potential for coercion by an em-
ployer over an hourly wage-earner.3 2 They also recognized the very serious
possibility of increased corporate activity through the legal means of a PAC
and were particularly troubled by the unrestricted solicitation provision. Dis-
approval of the FEC's opinion was vitriolic enough to begin immediate
pressure for legislative action. 33 In addition, on January 30, 1976, the
The effect of such an advisory opinion is that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision
of law, any person with respect to whom an advisory opinion is rendered . . . who
acts in good faith in accordance with the provisions and findings of such advisory opin-
ion shall be presumed to be in compliance with the provision[s] of [the Act]." 2 U.S.C.
§ 437f(b) (Supp. V 1975).
29. Sun Oil also sought approval of a proposed trustee plan where the corporation
would open separate checking accounts for each contributing participant. That donor
would then designate whom he wished to receive contributions deposited in the account.
Because the participant would at all times maintain control over who would receive
his funds, the FEC did not deem this type of program to involve a contribution under
18 U.S.C. § 610. 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584-86 (1975).
30. The apparently artificial distinction drawn between the right to solicit and the
right to accept contributions is not insignificant. See notes 116-24 & accompanying
text infra.
31. The United States Chamber of Commerce reported that on the day of the Sun
Oil advisory opinion (Dec. 3, 1975), 137 corporations had PAC's registered with the
FEC, but by March 1, 1976, 197 committees had registered. 8 NAT'L J. 470, 471
(1976).
32. See id. at 473.
33. Representative Brademas, a majority member of the Committee on House Ad-
1977]
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Supreme Court had ruled in Buckley v. Valeo 4 that the FEC's composition
violated the appointments clause of the Constitution.35  These two factors
taken together led to the hurried passage, with hearings only in the Senate, of
the FECA Amendments of 1976 and their enactment into law on May 11,
1976.36 Besides resurrecting the FEC through the constitutional process, the
amendments sought other "reforms."
A significant portion of the bill sets forth limitations on whom a corpora-
tion may solicit for contributions to its political fund. The statute provides
that a corporation may solicit any of its employees twice yearly, provided
that the corporation will not learn who has contributed $50 or less. 37 Only
ministration, remarked that "[tihe current controversy has arisen solely because the
Federal Election Commission, through the advisory opinion process, has sought to
change the rules notwithstanding the clearly articulated intent of Congress." 122 CONG.
REC. H3782 (daily ed. May 3, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Brademas). Several other
representatives expressed similar views. See id. at H3780 (remarks of Rep. Wiggins and
Rep. Thompson); id. at H2613 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Gaydos).
34. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
35. As originally constituted, two of the six members of the Commission were nomi-
nated by the President, but confirmation had to come not only from the Senate, but
also from the House of Representatives. Of the other four members, two were appointed
by the Speaker of the House, and two by the President pro tempore of the Senate.
As a result, none of the members was appointed as required by the appointments clause.
U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2. But the Court did not invalidate the Commission for
that reason alone:
Thus, on the assumption that all of the powers granted in the statute may
be exercised by an agency whose members have been appointed in accordance
with the Appointments Clause, the ultimate question is which, if any, of those
powers may be exercised by the present voting Commissioners, none of whom
was appointed as provided by that clause ...
Insofar as the powers confided in the Commission are essentially of an in-
vestigative and informative nature, falling in the same general category as
those powers which Congress might delegate to one of its own committees,
there can be no question that the Commission as presently constituted may
exercise them.
424 U.S. at 137 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). With respect to its en-
forcement and administrative duties, however, the Commission was prohibited from
functioning beyond a 30-day stay. As a result, the Commission as then constituted was
unable to approve federal matching funds for the qualifying 1976 presidential primary
candidates. This alone created great pressure to proceed with the reconstitution of the
Commission, which the 1976 amendments effected. See generally Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments, 1976; Hearings on S. 2911, S. 2912, S. 2918, S. 2953, S. 2980,
and S. 2987 Before the Subcomm. on Privileges and Elections of the Senate Committee
on Rules and Administration, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
36. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 26
U.S.C.). The amendments also recodified 18 U.S.C. § 610, which included the Hansen
amendment to the 1971 Act, as 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b (Cum. Supp. 1977). Section 441b
contains the relevant portion of the 1976 amendments.
37. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(4)(B) (Cum. Supp. 1977). The conference report ac-
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stockholders and "executive or administrative personnel" may be solicited
without limitation. 38  The conference report narrowly defines "executive or
administrative personnel," using language which had not even appeared in
the floor debates:
The term "executive or administrative personnel" is intended to
include the individuals who run the corporation's business, such as
officers, other executives, and plant, division, and section man-
agers, as well as individuals following the recognized professions,
such as lawyers and engineers, who have not chosen to separate
themselves from management by choosing a bargaining representa-
tive but is not intended to include professionals who are mem-
bers, of a labor organization, or foremen who have direct super-
vision over hourly employees, or other lower level supervisors such
as "strawbosses.'
39
By contrast, the statutory language suggests a more functional approach,
defining executive or administrative personnel simply as salaried employees
with "policymaking, managerial, professional, or supervisory responsibili-
ties."40
The other immediately relevant provisions of the 1976 amendments are
the requirements that at the time of solicitation, the solicitor must inform the
employee of the political nature of the fund and of the right to refuse to con-
tribute without reprisal. 41 Although the statute does not mention union
members, the conference report notes that the same rules apply when a labor
organization solicits its members.42
A further restriction on the political activities of corporations and labor
companying the amendment advised that the twice yearly mail solicitations be conducted
so that an independent third party receives all responses, keeps the necessary records,
and informs the corporation only of those who give a single contribution of over $50
or several contributions, in the aggregate totaling in excess of $100. CONF. REP. No.
94-1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 63 (1976); [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 978.
38. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(4) (A) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
39. CONF. REP. No. 94-1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976); [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 977. For floor debates on this definition, see 122 CONG. REC.
H3779, 3781 (daily ed. May 3, 1976); id. at H2533, 2537-42 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1976);
id. at S4153, 4157 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1976).
40. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977). Should the difference between
the language of the statute and of the regulation be more than merely illusory, the PAC
manager's compliance with the statute should, obviously, provide a good defense to
FEC challenge founded on its regulation. The effect of the regulation's variance is
discussed more fully at notes 87-89 & accompanying text infra.
41. Id. § 441b(b)(3)(B) & (C).
42. CONF. REP. No. 94-1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1976); [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 979.
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organizations is the "anti-proliferation" provision. Under the contributions
and expenditures limitations, a multi-candidate political committee43 may
give a maximum of $5,000 per election to any one candidate. However, the
contributions from all PAC's established, administered, or controlled by a
single corporation or by its parent, subsidiaries, divisions or branches, or by
a union or any of its local units, are deemed to be made from a single po-
litical action committee and hence are collectively subject to the $5,000 per
candidate limitation.44  Consequently, the parent corporation and, for ex-
ample, each of its three subsidiaries, could not each give the maximum
$5,000 to one candidate through their four separate political action commit-
tees, thereby giving a total of $20,000. Instead, the contributions to a single
candidate from all four committees could not total more than $5,000.
Faced with the necessity of drafting legislation to reconstitute the FEC as
a result of Buckley v. Valeo, Congress took on the chore of extensive revision
of the federal election laws. In its haste, it failed to give thoughtful and non-
partisan attention to certain provisions, particularly those concerning cor-
porate and labor organization PAC activities. As a result, the constitutional-
ity of those provisions is in serious doubt.
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CORPORATE POLITICAL
ACTION COMMITTEES
An examination of the traditional justifications for regulating campaign
contributions-avoiding the effect of amassed wealth in federal elections and
protecting minority interests on the ground that corporate officials have no
moral right to use corporate funds without approval of the shareholders-
is critical to an understanding of the current legislative and judicial sanctions
and restrictions governing corporate political action committees. Assuming
that first amendment rights exist when political expression is involved, the
significance of these two state interests will determine the constitutionality of
any restrictions placed on the exercise of such political expression. 45
The purpose of avoiding the effect of aggregated wealth is somewhat
43. Title 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1977) defines a "multi-candidate
political committee" as one which has been registered with the FEC for at least six
months, has received contributions from more than 50 persons, and has made contribu-
tions to at least five federal candidates.
44. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
45. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476 (1957); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945). See also Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
[Vol. 26:756
Corporate Political Action Committees
ambiguous. The underlying aim could reflect a governmental interest in re-
stricting any use of amassed wealth, without regard to its source, or it could
be construed as a restriction only on the source of contributions. Interpreting
the contribution restrictions imposed by pre-1971 law, the Supreme Court has
adopted the latter explanation. In Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States,
the Court said:
When Congress prohibited labor organizations from making contri-
butions or expenditures in connection with federal elections, it was,
of course, concerned not only to protect minority interests within
the union but to eliminate the effect of aggregated wealth on fed-
eral elections. But the aggregated wealth it plainly had in mind
was the general union treasury-not the funds donated by union
members of their own free and knowing choice.
46
In effect, the Court indicated that if contributions came from a voluntary
source, the policy of avoiding "the effect of aggregated wealth" was not vio-
lated. The Court believed that Congress had intended to restrict only the
corporate or union source of contributions.
Whether the Court in Pipefitters intended to modify the dual purpose of
eliminating the impact of amassed wealth and protecting minority interests
by lookipg only for voluntariness has been mooted by the 1971 Act and sub-
sequent legislation. Numerous statutory elements now define the restrictions
and the sanctions of corporate PAC functioning. These include the separate
segregated fund requirement, permissible treasury fund expenditures, control
of the fund, the "voluntary" requirement, and the scope of the audience.
The first four of these elements restrict the free exercise of first amendment
rights only minimally and do advance the valid state interest of reducing the
influence of money on federal elections. Indeed, regardless of which inter-
pretation of that interest is applied, those four elements effectively accommo-
date the dual congressional concerns elaborated by the Court in Pipefitters.
It is the fifth element, the scope of the audience provisions, that did not
achieve a constitutionally sound balance.
A. The Separate Segregated Fund Requirement
The Hansen amendment to FECA carved out the separate segregated fund
exception to the definition of "contribution or expenditure." In his explana-
tory floor statement, Representative Hansen said only that "[t]his fund must
be separate from any union or corporate funds," 47 and offered no further in-
terpretation of the nature of the fund.
46. 407 U.S. at 415-16 (emphasis added).
47. 117 CONG. REc. 43,379 (1971).
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It remained for the Supreme Court in Pipefitters to clarify the definition
of separate segregated fund. In that case the union and three of its officers
had been convicted of conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 610, which
prohibited campaign contributions by banks, labor organizations, and cor-
porations. From 1949 until 1962, the union had a political fund to which
members were required to contribute. In 1962, the fund became a separate
"voluntary" fund. However, certain of the union's officers still maintained
control over the fund, and the method of soliciting remained the same-on
union time at the job site, with a "contribution" rate based on hours worked.
The proceeds of the solicitations were kept in a fund separate from the
union's dues and assessments. 48  In its argument before the Court, the
government reasoned that "a valid fund may not be the alter ego of the
sponsoring union in the sense of being dominated by it and serving its pur-
poses, regardless of the fund's source of financing."'49 The Court rejected
the contention, finding that while " 'separate'" could be construed as re-
quiring "an apartness beyond 'segregated'; . . . the legislative history of
§ 205 [of the FECA of 1971] establishes that 'separate' is synonymous with
'segregated.' ", The Court held that a political fund "must be separate
from the sponsoring union only in the sense that there must be a strict
segregation of its monies from union dues and assessments."" 'Since the
Court had made no distinction between union and corporate PAC's, the
Pipefitters definition would appear to apply to corporate PAC's. Further,
because the 1976 amendments did not amend the separate segregated re-
quirement established by the FEC of 1971 the Pipefitters analysis of fund
separateness is still controlling.
The requirement that an organization's political fund be distinctly separate
from its general treasury funds bolsters both the purpose of protecting
minority interests and of minimizing the effect of amassed wealth. Represent-
ative Hansen placed special emphasis on this fact during the floor debate:
For the underlying theory of section 610 is that substantial
general purpose treasuries should not be diverted to political pur-
poses, both because of the effect on the political process of such
aggregated wealth and out of concern for the dissenting member
or stockholder. Obviously, neither of these considerations cuts
against allowing voluntary political funds. For no one who objects
to the organization's politics has to lend his support, and the money
48. 407 U.S. at 387-97.
49. Id. at 413.
50. Id. at 421-22, 426.
51. Id. at 414 (footnote omitted).
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collected is that intended by those who contribute to be used for
political purposes and not money diverted from another source.
5 2
If political contributions cannot be made from a commingled fund, then those
members, shareholders, or employees who choose not to support a union's
or corporation's political activities are assured that their interested shares of
the general treasury funds will not be so used. Such an arrangement legiti-
mately preserves a basic purpose of electoral law while only minimally in-
fringing on first amendment rights attached to political expression. The cor-
poration or union can still establish a PAC, and the shareholders or members
can choose whether or not to contribute. In fact, the separate fund require-
ment appears essential to balancing the interests at stake in this campaign
contribution mechanism.
B. Permissible Treasury Fund Expenditures
One of the most significant practical effects of the Hansen amendment was
to allow a corporation or union to underwrite the costs of establishing, ad-
ministering, and soliciting contributions to a separate segregated fund.
5 3
Under FECA, supporting does not constitute prohibited contributions or ex-
penditures. Representative Hansen did not believe that minority interests
were subverted by treasury expenditures made to create and maintain a
separate segregated fund. Rather, those interests were safeguarded through
other means, primarily the voluntariness of the fund.
5 4
52. 117 CONG. REc. 43,381 (1971).
53. This use of treasury funds was one of three exceptions to the definition of pro-
hibited contribution or expenditure. See notes 23-25 & accompanying text supra.
54. The historical rationale for creating this third exception and allowing treasury
funds to be expended to defer the expenses of a separate segregated fund is found in
earlier case law concerning a union's communications with its members. In United
States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 121 (1948), the Court declared:
If § 313 [of the Corrupt Practices Act, as amended by the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, prohibiting corporate or union contributions or
expenditures] were construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and
unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising
their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to their inter-
ests from the adoption of measures, or the election to office of men espousing
such measures, the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitu-
tionality.
The Court circumvented the "minority protection" interest because
[miembers of unions paying dues and stockholders of corporations know of
the practice of their respective organizations in regularly publishing periodi-
cals. It would require explicit words in an act to convince us that Congress
intended to bar a trade journal, a house organ or a newspaper, published by
a corporation, from expressing views on candidates or political proposals in
the regular course of its publication. . ..
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The Supreme Court in Pipejitters acknowledged possible interpretational
conflicts on this point, but indicated that prohibiting the use of treasury funds
for administration and solicitation costs "is neither the plain meaning nor, as
the legislative history of § 205 [of the FECA of 1971] shows, the intended
construction of the provision."5 5  Referring to the Hansen amendment, the
Court spoke of the intent for separate segregated funds to be one of the three
exceptions to the prohibition of the use of treasury funds. "In explaining
the three exemptions, Hansen clearly regarded each of them as a permissible
activity to be financed by general union funds, for each, in his view, was an
activity where group interests predominated and the 'interest of the minority
[was] weakest . ' "56 The Court cited Hansen's rationale for the three
exceptions:
We are unwilling to say that Congress by its prohibition against corporations
or labor organizations making an "expenditure in connection with any elec-
tion" of candidates for federal office intended to outlaw such a publication.
We do not think § 313 reaches such a use of corporate or labor organization
funds.
Id. at 123-24.
55. 407 U.S. at 429-30. An interesting, largely unresolved, question is whether the
voluntary approval by shareholders, employees (with reservations as to just which em-
ployees), or members of a union regarding contributions from general treasury funds
would overcome the general prohibition. Most likely, it would not.
The Court in Pipefitters noted that in United States v. Lewis Food Co., 336 F.2d
710 (9th Cir. 1966), the court of appeals upheld an indictment under § 610 that failed
to allege that a corporate expenditure in connection with a federal election had been
made without shareholder approval. 407 U.S. at 415 n.28. The appellate court argued
that mere shareholder approval would not be sufficient to legalize such an expenditure.
In other words, the legislative purpose of avoiding the effect of corporate wealth on
campaigns would be violated if by merely obtaining shareholder approval, a corporation
could do what was otherwise forbidden by § 610. The court further noted that in
United States v. Auto Workers, 352 U.S. 567 (1957), the Supreme Court had not re-
quired a showing in the indictment that union expenditures to finance political television
broadcasts were made without member approval. Id.
The Court in Pipefitters suggested that the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Auto Workers
was "misplaced." The indictment there alleged that the contribution was made from
union dues which were not voluntarily contributed by its members. "In Auto Workers,
therefore, we had no occasion to address the legitimacy of union-controlled political
contributions financed from the knowing free-choice donations of union members." 407
U.S. at 416 n.28. However, the Court did not suggest that the court in Lewis Food
was wrong, because a political contribution from corporate or union general treasury
funds is indeed an offense. The Court only stated that the effect of voluntary approval
of a political contribution from treasury funds was a specific issue which the Court
has not yet decided. At most, such voluntary approval was said to be a defense. Id.
56. 407 U.S. at 430-31 (footnote omitted). The other 2 exemptions were communi-
cations to and non-partisan get-out-the-vote drives aimed at stockholders or union mem-
bers and their families. Id. at 430.
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"At the present time [Hansen summarized] there is broad
agreement as to the essence of the proper balance in regulating cor-
porate and union political activity required by sound policy and the
Constitution. It consists of a strong prohibition on the use of cor-
porate and union treasury funds to reach the general public in sup-
port of, or opposition to, Federal candidates and a limited permis-
sion to corporations and unions, allowing them to communicate
freely with members and stockholders on any subject, to attempt
to convince members and stockholders to register and vote, and to
make political contributions and expenditures financed by volun-
tary donations which have been kept in a separate segregated fund.
This amendment writes that balance into clear and unequivocal
statutory language.15
7
This "limited permission" to use treasury funds was also approved in the
FEC's Sun Oil advisory opinion. The Commission's first conclusion was:
[I]t is lawful for Sun Oil to expend general treasury funds to
defray expenses incurred in establishing, administering, and solicit-
ing contributions to SUN PAC so long as it is maintained as a
separate segregated fund. The language of section 610 and the
supporting legislative history of the 1971 Amendment to the statute
plainly permits such expenditures. 8
Although the FEC's opinion has been much maligned and actually altered
in some respects by the 1976 amendments, the dissatisfaction centered on
other aspects of the ruling, not on the decision's treatment of the costs of
establishing and soliciting for the PAC. Consequently, one can reasonably
look to Sun Oil as the FEC's interpretation of this aspect of campaign law.
Nothing in either the 1976 amendments, the conference report, or the floor
debates appears to change the scope of permissible treasury expenditures.
The significance of allowing the use of general treasury funds to underwrite
the expenses of running a PAC cannot be overstated. The costs are myriad.
Printing, mailing, and soliciting expenses are obvious. Hidden costs-such
as allocable personnel salaries, equipment and even possible legal fees for
the PAC-would likely be even greater than direct solicitation costs. For
one company the mailing costs alone for a recent shareholder solicitation were
between $12,500 and $15,000. There was a $32,000 return on the solici-
tation.59 It is easy to appreciate that unless the corporation or union under-
writes all the expenses, a political action committee would hardly be able to
57. 407 U.S. at 431, quoting 117 CONG. REc. 43,381 (1971).
.58. F.E.C. Advisory Opinion 1975-23, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584 (1975).
59. Interview with David W. Twomey, public affairs consultant and secretary of SUN
PAC Committee, Sun Oil Company, in Washington, D.C. (Jan. 7, 1977).
19771
Catholic University Law Review
support itself, much less have surplus funds for contributions to candidates.
At any rate, there is little doubt that general treasury funds may legally be
expended to establish, administer, and solicit contributions to a political
action committee. 60
Permitting the use of treasury funds for these specific purposes effectively
gives the corporation or labor organization an indirect opportunity to en-
courage political activity which it considers a valid group interest. At the
same time, the minority interests are not unjustly constricted, since the ex-
pended funds seek to further a legitimate institutional interest without a direct
expenditure for political purposes. The separate fund requirement promotes
the traditional purposes of federal election legislation without unduly limiting
any first amendment freedoms.
C. Control of the Fund
Closely related to the separate segregated fund requirement is the matter
of who may control the funds in a political action committee. This issue is
apparently well resolved. The Court in Pipefitters remarked that "[n]o-
where, however, has Congress required that the political organization be for-
mally or functionally independent of union control or that union officials be
barred from soliciting contributions or even precluded from determining how
the monies raised will be spent." 61 Indeed, the legislative history seems to
propose no restrictions on the control of the fund.
In concluding the explanatory remarks on his amendment, Representative
Hansen called attention to "a limited permission to corporations and unions
. . . to make political contributions and expenditures financed by voluntary
donations which have been kept in a separate segregated fund. ' '6 2  Admit-
tedly, there is no express statement granting the corporation or union the dis-
cretion to determine how the fund is spent, but that conclusion is not a
strained one.
The Federal Election Commission itself has adopted this interpretation.
In its proposed regulations, the Commission unequivocally states that "[a]
corporation, membership organization, cooperative corporation without capi-
tal stock, or labor organization may exercise control over its separate segre-
gated fund."63 Although little mention has been made either in cases or
60. There is, however, some indication that the Internal Revenue Service is consid-
ering a ruling which would prohibit deduction of these costs as ordinary business ex-
penses. See Wall St. J., May 20, 1976, at 1, col. 6, & 37, col. 3-4.
61. 407 U.S. at 415.
62. 117 CONG. REc. 43,381 (1971).
63. .41 Fed. Reg. 35,958 (1976). Proposed regulations may be prescribed in final
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legislative history of the issue of control of a separate segregated fund, it is
another critical element in a corporation's or union's interest in establishing
a PAC.
The 1976 amendments have not altered an institution's right to control the
political fund. The free exercise of that right is essential to the corporation
or labor organization in pursuing its group interests. Minority concerns are
in no way hindered because the fund which is being controlled is separate
and segregated from general treasury funds. Just as allowing treasury fund
expenditures for administrative costs is an appropriate balancing of the in-
terests, so, too, is granting control of the fund to the institution.
D. The "Voluntary" Requirement
The requirement that contributions to a separate segregated fund be made
voluntarily implies that they also be made with knowledge of the political
nature of the fund. The voluntary requirement is, and has been, vital to
the existence of a separate segregated fund. Without it, the most basic
notions of fair play would be violated and the clear legislative intent to pro-
tect the rights of the minority would be ignored. Yet it is difficult both to
apply and to enforce a standard of voluntariness because it is so highly sub-
jective.
From the legislative inception of the separate segregated fund, there have
appeared warnings that contributions to it must be voluntary. The Hansen
amendment contained the proviso that it would be unlawful for a PAC to
make a contribution out of funds "secured by physical force, job discrimina-
tion, financial reprisals [or the threat thereof], or by dues, fees or other
monies required as a condition of membership 'in a labor organization or as
a condition of employment.' ",64 Hansen explained that this language was
to insure that contributions were voluntary. He recognized that certain situa-
tions may create residual aspects of compulsion, if only in the mind of the
person being solicited-for example, the farmer solicited by the head of his
local farm organization or the businessman solicited by one who happens to
be his banker. "The proper approach, and the one adopted here," he
reasoned, "is to provide the strong assurance that a refusal to contribute will
form by the FEC only after they have been before Congress for 30 legislative days and
not disapproved within that time. 2 U.S.C.A. § 438(c) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
64. See note 23 supra. The Court in Pipefitters concedes that the term "threat"
could be construed narrowly to mean only the actual intention to inflict harm. The
legislative history, however, makes clear that the better interpretation is that it "includes
the creation of an appearance of an intent to inflict injury even without a design to
carry it out." 407 U.S. at 421-22, 427.
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not lead to reprisals and to leave the rest to the independence and good sense
of each individual.)
65
The relative simplicity of Hansen's approach is attractive, but it has not
been sufficient to quell all the problems arising in this highly sensitive area.
In the Pipefitters case, contributors to the union's political fund generally
signed authorization cards indicating that their contributions were" 'voluntary
. . . [and] no part of the dues or financial obligations of Local Union No.
562,'" and testimony during the trial indicated that "no specific pressure was
exerted, and no reprisals were taken, to obtain donations." 66 However, on
cross-examination the union's attorney admitted that when the fund was es-
tablished, he had counseled union officials that while contributions to the
fund could not be made a condition of employment, it would not matter if
members, when solicited, thought they were compulsory.
67
The Court in Pipefitters reversed the appellate court's finding that the fund
was a subterfuge by which the union made contributions of treasury funds 6s
and remanded the case because instructions to the jury had failed to require
a showing that the contributions were actually dues or assessments. 69 In
other words, the Court believed that the voluntariness of the contributions
was critical in determining whether section 610 had been violated. 70  The
test of voluntariness which the Court proposes-in addition to being free from
physical force, job discrimination, or financial reprisal, or the "threat" thereof
-is "whether the method of solicitation for the fund was calculated to result
in knowing free-choice donations.17 1 The Court does not, however, develop
any specific guidelines, beyond the statutory language of force and threats,
65. 117 CoNG. REc. 43,381 (1971).
66. 407 U.S. at 394.
67. Id. at 395 & n.8.
68. 407 U.S. 385 (1972), rev'g 434 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1970).
69. 407 U.S. at 435-42.
70. In the Court's words,
We hold . . . that, although solicitation by union officials is permissible, such
solicitation must be conducted under circumstances plainly indicating that do-
nations are for a political purpose and that those solicited may decline to con-
tribute without loss of job, union membership, or any other reprisal within
the union's institutional power. ...
m . . The test of voluntariness under § 610 focuses on whether the con-
tributions solicited for political use are knowing free-choice donations. The
dominant concern in requiring that contributions be voluntary was, after all,
to protect the dissenting stockholder or union member. Whether the solicitation
scheme is designed to inform the individual solicited of the political nature
of the fund and his freedom to refuse support is, therefore, determinative.
Id. at 414-15.
71. Id. at 439.
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for a reasonable solicitation method. The opinion suggests that the court
questioned the union counsel's approval of leaving the solicitee
with the impression that contributions were a condition of employment.
Justice Powell, in his dissenting opinion, addressed the method-of-solicita-
tion problem more directly. He was critical of the "authorization" card
procedure adopted by Local 562:
If, on remand, the techniques of local 562 should be sanctioned,
other unions and corporations could easily follow Local 562 and
obtain from members, employees, and shareholders a consent form
attesting that the contribution (or withholding) is "voluntary."
The trappings of voluntariness might be achieved while the sub-
stance of coercion remained. Union members and corporate em-
ployees might find themselves the objects of regular and sys-
tematized solicitation by the very agent which exercises direct con-
trol over their jobs and livelihood.
72
The very sensitive employer-employee relationship has been cited by other
sources as inherently susceptible to coercion. The FEC acknowledged this
problem, and in its Sun Oil advisory opinion recommended three guidelines
to minimize or remove the possibility of coercion: "First, no supervisor
should solicit a subordinate. Second, the solicitor should inform the solicited
employee of the political purpose of the fund for which the contribution is
solicited. Third, the solicitor should inform the employee of the employee's
right to refuse to contribute without reprisal of any kind."' 73 The third Com-
mission guideline reiterated the proviso of the 1971 Act, prohibiting use
of threat of reprisals. The first and second guidelines were, in addition, con-
scientious attempts to assure the voluntariness of the contribution.
Despite the Commission's somewhat elaborate safeguards, congressional
reaction to the Sun Oil opinion was largely negative primarily because
of its approval of corporate solicitation of employees. Senator Cannon,
Chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, in his
explanatory remarks on S. 3605 (the Senate version of the 1976 amend-
ments) equated the FEC's widened audience with the chance of coer-
cion. "It is felt that such an interpretation [the FEC's ruling] creates extra-
ordinary pressure and potential for coercion, which was even acknowledged
by the Commission in its advisory opinion, in a situation where management
of a corporation is permitted to solicit political contributions from all its
employees."
'7 4
72. Id. at 449.
73. 40 Fed. Reg. at 56,585 (1975).
74. 122 CONG. REc. S3518 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1976).
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Representative Thompson, ranking majority member of the House Admin-
istration Committee, appeared to ignore the FEC's guidelines during debate
on the 1976 amendments. He cited one of the ill effects of the FEC's
opinion as "the coercion inherent in the solicitation of employees by employ-
ers" and continued, "[t]he employee is going to be intimidated and coerced,
because the entity soliciting the funds is, for all practical purposes, the same
as, or closely related to the one which also gives the salary raises and promo-
tions."7 5 Thompson saw this almost inevitable coercive effect as a major
reason for "the particular balance established by section 610 in 1971,
which the SUN PAC advisory opinion so drastically altered in 1975."76
Although the potential for coercion exists in the employer-employee re-
lationship, Representative Thompson did not directly support his assertion
that coercion is an inherent, unretractable element of that relationship.
The Court's concern in Pipefitters that the method of solicitation would
determine the presence of coercion seems to be a more reasonable approach
than the broad assumption that coercion will inevitably be present in the soli-
citation of employees. Admittedly, Pipefitters dealt not with employer-
employee, but rather with union-member, solicitation. Nevertheless, circum-
stances can exist where a union, as collective bargaining agent in negotiating
wages and benefits, for example, is in as much a "livelihood-determining"
position toward a member as an employer is toward an employee. Further-
more, if fear of coercion were to halt all or most solicitation of this kind, the
employee, shareholder, or member would effectively be denied the ready op-
portunity to join together with those of shared interests for the purpose of
influencing federal elections.
The 1976 amendments appear to accommodate the possiblity of avoiding
or minimizing coercion without entirely halting previously allowed solicita-
tions. Congress kept the Hansen proviso and added two of the three FEC
proposed guidelines, requiring that all solicitees be informed of the political
nature of the fund and of their right not to contribute without reprisal. 77 It
is not clear why Congress failed to include the third guideline which was a
part of the Senate bill as first introduced.78 It would certainly not be a strong
deterrent to the operation of a PAC if a supervisor were not allowed to solicit
a subordinate, and it might tend to reduce the appearance or fact of coercion.
The FEC's proposed regulations follow the statute directly, abandoning the
75. Id. at H2612 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976).
76. Id.
77. See 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 441b(b)(3)(B) & (C) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
78. S. 3065, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 321(b)(2)(B) (1976).
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Sun Oil supervisor-subordinate prohibition.79 Beyond the statutory provisos,
little attention is given to regulating methods of solicitation as a means of
reducing the possibility of coercion. The statute also makes available to
labor organizations any method of solicitation permitted by law to corpora-
tions.80 Accordingly, the proposed regulations appear to emphasize the
creation of circumstances from which corporate and union PAC's can oper-
ate with relative equality.8 '
The twice yearly solicitation, section 441b(b)(4)(B), is seemingly the only
other attempt by the 1976 amendments to prevent coercion by controlling
the means of solicitation. Under the provisions of this section, a solicitation
may be addressed to any employee and must be in writing to the home ad-
dress and designed so that the corporation, labor organization, or separate
segregated fund conducting the solicitation cannot determine who makes or
does not make a contribution of $50 or less as a result of such solicitation.
In the context of the wider audience solicitation, therefore, maintaining con-
fidentiality is intended to avoid coercion. Senator Cannon explained that
"[t]his restriction is valuable protection against person-to-person coercion,
and provides a degree of anonymity so corporations or unions cannot set up
elaborate systems to monitor who contributes and who does not."82 He pro-
vided the further caveat that a payroll checkoff system to withhold contribu-
tions automatically from an employee's paycheck could not be used in con-
nection with the twice yearly solicitation. "[O]nce you permit the use of
the checkoff, you put the [corporation, union, or PAC] in a position to main-
tain a list, and to be able to say, 'Here are the people who have contributed
by a checkoff; we better see about the people who did not.' "183 Although the
statute does not prescribe a method to assure confidentiality, the FEC's pro-
posed regulations recommend a custodial arrangement, where an independ-
ent third party receives and keeps records of all contributions.
8 4
79. 41 Fed. Reg. at 35,958 (1976).
80. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b) (5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
81. 41 Fed. Reg. at 35,959-60 (1976).
82. 122 CONG. REC. S4151 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1976). The only way that anonymity
will not be maintained is if the individual so elects, or if the contribution or total
contributions in any calendar year, exceed $100.00, so that reporting requirements are
triggered. See id. at S4151, 4156; § 114.6 of the proposed regulations, 41 Fed. Reg.
at 35,959-60 (1976); F.E.C. Advisory Opinion 1976-47, 1 Camp. Prac. Rpt. 4:118.
83. 122 CONG. REC. S4156 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1976). Ci. Letter from H.E. Petersen,
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Richard D.
Godown, General Counsel, Nat'l Ass'n of Manufacturers (Aug. 28, 1973) (because
checkoff systems "are so potentially coercive," regardless of good intentions, any corpo-
ration or union using such a system "must be prepared at all times to demonstrate
that contributions made through it are truly voluntary").
84. 41 Fed. Reg. at 35,959-60 (1976).
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The requirement that all contributions to a separate segregated fund be
given voluntarily, without coercion, may well be the most difficult part of es-
tablishing and soliciting contributions to a political action committee. Be-
cause of its particularly subjective nature, the issue of voluntariness could
prove to be the most controversial and, perhaps the most litigated aspect of
political action committees.
Prescribing specific methods of solicitation may infringe more on first
amendment rights than either the separate segregated fund, permissible
treasury fund expenditures, or control requirements. But protecting against
coercion of the minority who may not wish to contribute has been clearly
identified as a deserving and valid interest. Restrictions designed to assure
the voluntary character of a political fund, therefore, may not be too great
an intrusion into the corporation's or labor organization's first amendment
rights. However, restrictions on the class of persons whom a PAC may
solicit present a far greater infringement.
E. The Restricted Audience
The greatest effect of the 1976 amendments on the operation of PAC's
was the limitation placed on the audience which a corporate PAC can solicit.
Prior to the 1976 amendments, no such artificial audience restrictions had
been imposed.85 At present, by allowing unlimited solicitations to be
directed only to executive or administrative personnel, 86 the statute un-
reasonably impedes the corporation's communication of political ideas to its
employees. This is a substantial infringement of the corporation's first
amendment rights which is not justified by a significant furtherance of any
valid purpose of federal election legislation. Given the other restrictions on
a PAC's functioning, the minority receives no protection by limiting the cor-
porate employees who may be solicited.
Three rationales have been advanced for limiting a corporate PAC to
addressing only its executive or administrative personnel in an unrestricted
solicitation, that is, not the twice yearly solicitation. First, management-level
employees and shareholders have a presumed direct interest in the fate of
the corporate enterprise. Second, as a result of concern over employee-
perceived coercion resulting from any political solicitation by an employer,
the audience should be limited only to those least likely to be coerced.
Third, the Sun Oil advisory opinion destroyed the parity which existed be-
85. See 40 Fed. Reg. at 56,585 (1975).
86. These restrictions are specifically set out at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 41lb(b) (4) (A) &
(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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tween corporate and union PAC solicitation by allowing a corporation to
solicit all its employees. In order to restore balance between the two, the
audience available to the corporation will be restricted.
The first rationale is open to criticism on two grounds. To begin with,
Congress had drawn a very hesitant and unclear definition of the group
termed "executive or administrative personnel." 87 Therefore, it is difficult to
understand why such a vaguely defined class can be deemed to be one with
a greater stake in success of the corporate venture. During the joint House-
Senate conference on the 1976 amendments, the broader Senate term "execu-
tive or administrative personnel" was substituted for the House's "executive
officer."88 The conference report then proceeded to define "executive or ad-
ministrative personnel" to exclude "foremen who have direct supervision over
hourly employees, or other lower level supervisors such as 'strawbosses'." 89
The exclusion of foremen had not been raised during the debate in either
house.
To add to the confusion, the FEC's proposed regulations refer to the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA),90 and to the regulations issued pursuant to
that Act, 91 "as a guideline in determining whether individuals have policy-
making, managerial, professional, or supervisory responsibilities. '92 Section
541 of the FLSA regulations is generally concerned with defining jobs in
order to determine whether certain positions are exempt from or covered by
the Fair Labor Standards Act.93 The regulations do not establish fixed
definitions of various jobs. Rather, they go through lengthy functional
analyses to decide whether a job is exempt or nonexempt. 94 As a result,
by reference to these regulations, certain foremen might reasonably be classi-
fied as exempt from provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act. Does it
follow that, if the FEC's regulations were finally issued with the reference to
the Fair Labor Standards Act intact, then for the purposes of corporate PAC
solicitations, some foremen could be solicited (those whose job functions
make them exempt employees) and others could not be solicited? The FEC
regulations imply an affirmative answer.
87. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441b(b)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
88. CONF. REP. No. 94-1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976); [1976] U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 977.
89. Id.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. (1970).
91. 29 C.F.R. § 541 (1974).
92. 41 Fed. Reg. at 35,936 (1976).
93. 29 C.F.R. § 541 (1974).
94. See, e.g., id. §§ 541.1 (definition of "employee employed in a bona fide execu-
tive ... capacity"); 541.2 (definition of "employee employed in a bona fide . . . admin-
istrative . . . capacity"); 541.115 (definition of "working foremen").
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Furthermore, it may be possible to include certain foremen within the class
of executive or administrative personnel by reference to a recent FEC ad-
visory opinion. 95 In that opinion the FEC suggested the possibility of rebut-
ting the presumption that the supervision of hourly employees-if that is the
main function of a supervisor-places him outside the class of "executive or
administrative personnel." "Where . . .the supervision of hourly employees
is the principal function of the supervisory employee, as is the case with most
line supervisors, then, absent strong evidence to the contrary, that employee
would not be within the class of executive and administrative personnel." 6
It follows that one whose job title is "foreman" could possibly be included
within the executive or administrative personnel class either by reference to
the Fair Labor Standards Act job function definitions or by the "strong evi-
dence" approach suggested in the recent advisory opinion. In either case the
process is unpredictable. Congress has not, in fact, fixed a class of employ-
ees that can be said to have a close affinity with the corporate enterprise.
The rationale for restricting the audience to those with a "greater stake" in
the enterprise is seriously undermined when the definition of that class of em-
ployees is so difficult a task.
Limiting unrestricted solicitations to executive or administrative personnel
is questionable for another reason. It is difficult to accept wholly the notion
that some employees have a "greater stake" than others. Representa-
tive Brademas spoke of the "legitimate interests of [the corporation's] owners
and management" and the corresponding "legitimate interests" of members
in their unions.97  The better view would seem to be that any employee
whose livelihood flows from his corporate employer has a direct interest in
that employer's success or failure.98 It is illogical to conclude that an execu-
tive vice president has a greater dependence on his employer than an
assembly-line worker does. Though the former may have a larger salary,
his or her relative stake is no more significant. Limiting solicitation to higher
salaried employees is essentially inconsistent with the notion of excluding
monetary wealth as a criterion for election contributions. Indeed, if prevent-
ing money from speaking louder than ideas is a legitimate concern, then re-
95. See F.E.C. Advisory Opinion 1976-75 (Oct. 1, 1976), 1 Camp. Prac. Rpt. 4:129.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. 122 CONG. REc. H3782 (daily ed. May 3, 1976).
98. In a different context, Justice Powell, dissenting in Pipeitters, drew attention
to the close relationship between employees and the corporate employer. He described
the latter as "the very agent which exercises direct control over their jobs and liveli-
hood." 407 U.S. at 449. Interestingly, Justice Powell made no distinction between
classes of employees and, in fact, was speaking directly of the union members involved
in that case.
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strictions should not be placed on the solicitation of lower-salaried or hourly-
wage employees. In sum, the direct interest rationale does not seem to sup-
port the statutory limitation placed on the audience.
The second possible explanation for restricting corporate PAC solicitation
is to avoid potential coercion of those considered most susceptible. The
amendments limit solicitation of nonexecutive and nonadministrative per-
sonnel to twice yearly solicitations. Although the limitation in the amend-
ment reflects a valid intent, the operation of the amendment does not ade-
quately accommodate that intent. Certainly the purpose of avoiding coercion
is laudable, and to the extent that limiting the scope of the audience would
avoid coercion, it might be a justified restriction. Simple logic, however, sug-
gests that it is not necessarily hourly employees or those without policy-
making, managerial, supervisory, or professional responsibilities who are the
most vulnerable to coercion. Rather, it is the executive, managerial, or
supervisory personnel who may be the most susceptible. They will feel the
subtle, perhaps unintentional, pressure to participate, to "go along," to "give
their fair shares." A corporate PAC would find it far more lucrative to be
overly persuasive in the board room than on the assembly line.
Assuming this to be the case-and this line of reasoning is compelling-
then Congress has either: (1) recognized the possible coercion in a solici-
tation of executive or administrative personnel and satisfied itself that the
safeguards written into the statute as solicitation provisos will suffice, or (2)
failed to recognize what group is most effectively vulnerable to coercion.
Given the great emphasis on the voluntariness of contributions, it is improb-
able that Congress altogether overlooked the possibility of coercion of
executive personnel. Therefore, if Congress has adequately protected the
right of an executive or administrative employee to refuse to participate
without fear of or actual reprisals, then similar safeguards would seem ade-
quate to protect those for whom Congress provided special "protection."
The final rationale-preserving parity between union and corporate PAC's
-is frequently mentioned in congressional debates. Moreover, in their Sun
Oil dissent, Commissioners Harris and Tiernan argued forcefully that it was
Representative Hansen's and Congress' intent "to hold the balance even" be-
tween union and corporate solicitations to political funds.9 9 They argued that
the majority destroyed that balance by allowing SUN PAC to solicit its
126,555 shareholders and 27,700 employees (figures as of December 31,
1974), while labor would be restricted to soliciting the small percentage of
the employees who were actually union members. 100
99. 40 Fed. Reg. at 56,587 (1975) (Comm'rs Harris & Tiernan dissenting).
100. Id. As the dissenting Commissioners projected that imbalance:
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In addition, Commissioners Harris and Tiernan urge other than a literal
interpretation of the Hansen amendment.
[R]ead literally, the third exception would permit a corporation or
union to solicit not only stockholders or members, but the general
public, that is, anybody and everybody ...
A more rational construction of the statute is that the first and
third Hansen Amendment exceptions are to be read together. In-
dividuals cannot be solicited to make a voluntary contribution ex-
cept by communicating with them . . . . It creates an inexpli-
cable exception to [congressional] intent to read the permission to
solicit contributions as separate from the permission to communi-
cate with stockholders and members rather than reading these two
clauses of the same sentence together. 10 1
Thus, the Sun Oil dissent argues that the Hansen amendment intended to
restrict solicitations to separate segregated funds to an audience of corporate
shareholders and union members.
During debate on the 1976 amendments, the parity theory was frequently
cited as the purpose behind the Hansen amendment, and reestablishment of
parity was declared the goal of the most recent legislation. "Congress [in
1971] sought to establish a balance between the political activities allowed
to corporations and labor unions in order that the extent of political activities
carried on by either kind of entity might not burgeon so as completely to
overwhelm the activities of the other. '' 10 2  This argument continues by
noting that the 1976 amendments reestablish the "congressionally determined
balance between the interests of the business community and its stockholders,
and the interests of the labor community and its membership."' 03  In the
On a national scale, the majority ruling grants corporations as a group an un-
fair advantage over labor unions in the solicitation of political contributions.
It is estimated that over 30,900,000 individuals own shares of stock in Ameri-
can corporations. 1975 World Almanac 94. But, out of the nation's total
workforce of 84,000,000 workers, only 18,000,000 of them (or about 21%) are
members of labor unions . . . 1975 World Almanac 108. Had corporations
been restricted to soliciting only their stockholders, they could have solicited
almost twice as many individuals as labor unions. Under the majority's ruling,
however, corporations now have the potential of soliciting almost the entire
workforce of the nation. Congress certainly did not intend to create such a
gross disparity in the solicitation power of corporations and unions, by enacting
the segregated fund exception to § 610, as the majority of the Commission now
permits in its interpretation of the statute.
Id.
101. Id. at 56,586.
102. 122 CONo. REC. H3782 (daily ed. May 3, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Brademas).
103. 122 CONG. REC. H2612 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
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general context of the debate, Democratic members of the House of Repre-
sentatives appear, just as the Sun Oil dissent did, to define parity as having
two elements. First, the groups which corporate and union PAC's each may
solicit should be of relatively equal size, so that, second, each will receive
proportionate contributions as a result of the solicitations.104
The difficulty with this third rationale for restricting the audience, restora-
tion of pre-Sun Oil advisory opinion parity, is that numerical parity per se
may not be justified and that there is no clear evidence that numerical parity
was intended by the Hansen amendment. There is little to be said in favor
of creating solicitation rights based on equalizing the numbers to be solicited
and the predicted contributions to be received. If a right is created, it ought
not to be whittled away until the same number of people will benefit from
that right. While there are justified and reasonable means to restrict the ap-
plication of a right, for example, restricting it to those with a direct interest,
numerical parity lacks reasonableness. 10 5
To the extent that it is based on the intent of the Hansen amendment,
restoration of parity is also a weak rationale for limiting the audience. The
language of the amendment itself does not clearly indicate who could be
solicited. Nor do Representative Hansen's remarks during floor debate
clarify his intent on this subject.'06 During the 1976 debate, supporters of
104. For example, Representative Maguire argues that allowing corporations to solicit
only their shareholders while unions solicit their members would not give a numerical
advantage to unions. In support of this numerical parity argument, he cites the fact
that AT&T has 2.9 million shareholders and 999,796 employees, that the New York
Stock Exchange Review of 1974 says there are 31 million shareholders in the United
States, with a shareholder to employee ratio among major corporations of 3 to 2. "All
in all," he concludes, "the provision now in the bill appears equitable and symmetrical
with respect to the rights and privileges of solicitation for funds by corporations and
unions." Id. at H2614.
105. In its 1976 shareholder solicitation, Sun Oil, one of the very few corporations
actually to solicit shareholders, solicited 43,000 selected shareholders (those with in-
dividual and joint ownership of over 100 shares, excluding employees and most retirees,
except for retirees with over 1,000 shares) by mail. Personal phone calls were made
to 200 of the largest shareholders. Of the 43,000 solicited, 850 shareholders contributed.
Thirty percent of the 200 largest shareholders contributed, and 1.9% of the remaining
group contributed. Whether or not these figures indicate a good result, officials at Sun
Oil are pleased. They feel that such shareholder communication is very important and
that they now have 850 people with whom they can communicate. Interview with David
W. Twomey, supra note 59.
106. See 117 CONG. REC. 43,379-81 (1971). While not specifically resolving the is-
sue of who can be solicited, the Court in Pipelitters referred to the right to use
treasury funds to solicit contributions. "The dissent, too, appreciates 'the freedom of
union members, as well as that of employees and stockholders of corporations, to make
uncoerced political contributions.'" 407 U.S. at 401-02 n.12 (emphasis added). But
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restricting the corporate audience frequently referred to Hansen's "balancing"
of corporate and union rights. But in fact, the balance which Hansen sought
was much broader. It was the balance between impermissible corporate and
union political activities-the use of general treasury funds, and permissible
activities-the amendment's three exceptions.'0 7
Former Representative Hansen has himself recently stated that by intro-
ducing his amendment he did not intend to restrict the audience which could
be solicited. The specific issue of who could be solicited to contribute to a
separate segregated fund was not even raised at the time. The real focus
was registration and get-out-the-vote drives.' 08
None of the three rationales offered to support audience restriction
appears to justify adequately its inclusion in the 1976 amendments. Ex-
plaining why the provision was adopted is perhaps not as difficult as finding
an acceptable rationale. Representative Moore offers one explanation:
What then is the reason the current law is so radically altered
see 122 CONG. REC. H2538 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1976), in which Representative Brade-
mas noted:
It is of very great importance . . . to note that throughout consideration in
the House of the Hansen amendment, Mr. Hansen's remarks and those of other
Members of the House who took part in the debate without exception linked
the valid political interests of corporations to those of their stockholders, and
the valid political interests of labor unions to those of their members.
107. 117 CONG. Rac. 43,381 (1971).
At the present time there is broad agreement as to the essence of the proper
balance in regulating corporate and union political activity required by sound
policy and the Constitution. It consists of a strong prohibition on the use of
corporate and union treasury funds to reach the general public in support of,
or opposition to, Federal candidates and a limited permission to corporations
and unions, allowing them to communicate freely with members and stock-
holders on any subject, to attempt to convince members and stockholders to
register and vote, and to make political contributions and expenditures financed
by voluntary donations which have been kept in a separate segregated fund.
This amendment writes that balance into clear and unequivocal statutory lan-
guage.
Id. (Remarks of Rep. Hansen).
108. Interview with former Representative Orval Hansen, in Washington, D.C. (Jan.
7, 1977). He suggested that the real history of the amendment has not been told. He
considered his amendment a tactical move designed to save the entire bill by securing
union support. Labor had opposed the alternative Crane amendment, which also at-
tempted to codify prior court decisions, but which would have restricted union activity
in get-out-the-vote drives. The Hansen amendment was, therefore, a substitute amend-
ment. If the presiding officer in the House had not recognized Representative Hansen
before Representative Crane, his amendment might never have come to a vote. From
his present vantage point, Representative Hansen assumed that a corporation would only
attempt to reach certain employees, primarily executives, since they would be most likely
to respond with contributions. Id.
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in this bill? Since no hearings were held to develop evidence for
the need for such, one can only conclude the obvious-"politics."
The strongest and most effective coalition of political action com-
mittees in the Nation, those of labor unions, oppose any challenge
to their current collective political dominance as the most power-
ful special interest group in American politics today. 10 0
In summarizing recent federal election legislation it is clear that new
guidelines for the establishment and operation of PAC's are in effect. Con-
sideration of the voluntary-coercion problem and the audience limitation re-
quirements is especially critical, for it is these two matters that are left most
unsettled following the enactment of the 1976 amendments. To the extent
that litigation arises, it will likely fall in one of these two areas. The issue
of whether participation in a PAC has been mandatory is highly subjective
and tends to be volatile. That subject will probably be a matter of ongoing
debate. The restricted audience limitations, on the other hand, may seem
unjustified so that certain corporate interests will challenge their basic
legitimacy.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IN THE 1976
AMENDMENTS
Because of the broad scope of the audience provisions, challenges to the
constitutionality of section 441b can be expected. 110 One could argue that
allowing unrestricted corporate solicitations of shareholders and executive or
administrative personnel, plus restricted, twice yearly solicitations of all other
employees, is a reasonable compromise. A politically convenient compro-
mise will not, however, justify legislating away rights, particularly first
amendment rights. The scope of audience limitations may also reasonably
be read as supplementing the anti-coercion provision. This additional restric-
tion, however, is really not necessary. The pure anti-coercion provision, ill-
directed as it is, should adequately protect nonparticipating minorities. One
not persuaded by the arguments offered in justification for the scope of
audience provisions can imagine the basis for a constitutional attack.
The guarantee of first amendment rights is well established: a "preferred
109. 122 CONG. REc. H2539 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1976).
110. The Supreme Court has, until now, avoided a direct ruling on the constitutional-
ity of either § 441b or its predecessor, § 610. See United States v. UAW, 352 U.S.
567 (1957) (remand before reaching constitutional issues); United States v. CIO, 335
U.S. 106 (1948) (the Court avoided the constitutional issue by ruling that Congress
could not have meant to prohibit political recommendations through a union news-
paper). However, the constitutionality of § 610 was upheld in United States v. Boyle,
482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1076 (1973).
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place [is] given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable democratic
freedoms secured by the First Amendment." 11' It is through the first amend-
ment that political expression has been granted the widest protection, "to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."' 112 The Supreme Court has declared
that "speech concerning public affairs is more important than self-expression;
it is the essence of self-government."' 13 The Court has, of course, fashioned
tests to determine whether any infringement on first amendment rights is
justified. In Buckley v. Valeo, 1 4 the Court elaborated on the importance
of first amendment rights and the narrow circumstances under which they
can be restricted:
In view of the fundamental nature of the [first amendment] right
to associate, governmental "action which may have the effect of
curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny."
NAACP v. Alabama, [357 U.S. 449], 460-461 [1958]. Yet, it
is clear that "[n]either the right to associate nor the right to parti-
cipate in political activities is absolute." [Civil Service Commis-
sion] v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567 (1973). Even a
" 'significant interference' with protected rights of political associa-
tion" may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently im-
portant interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid un-
necessary abridgement of associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wi-
goda, 419 U.S. [477], 488 [1975]; NAACP v. Button, [371
U.S. 415], 438 [1963]; Shelton v. Tucker, [364 U.S. 479],
488 [1960].115
The Court in Buckley placed the right to contribute within the protected
rights of association. "Making a contribution, like joining a political party,
serves to affiliate a person with a candidate. In addition, it enables like-
minded persons to pool their resources in furtherance of common political
goals."116
Federal election legislation has not granted the right to solicit contributions
the same protection as has been judicially recognized for the right to make
contributions. During debate on the 1976 amendments, it was pointed out
that restrictions on corporate solicitations "in no way limit[s] the class of con-
111. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).
112. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). See also Mills v. Alabama,
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
113. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
114. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
115. Id. at 25.
116. Id. at 22.
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tributors, but only the class which may be solicited." 117 The FEC's proposed
regulations support this position that a corporation can receive contributions
from anyone allowed by law to make contributions. 1'8  In other words, the
audience which can contribute to a PAC remains unrestricted while only the
audience which can be solicited has been restricted. The 1976 amendments,
therefore, appear to be constitutionally sound in regard to the right to con-
tribute.
The right to solicit, however, is distinct from the right to contribute. Still,
it is arguably within the category of expression protected by the first amend-
ment. Representative Hansen and Commissioners Harris and Tiernan all
referred to solicitation as a communication:
The [Hansen] amendment sets forth the limited circumstances
where such communications are permitted in connection with an
election. These include:
(1) non-partisan registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns by
a corporation aimed at its stockholders and their families, or by a
labor organization aimed at its members and their families.
(2) the establishment, administration and solicitation of contri-
butions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for political
purposes by a corporation or labor organization.' 19
Indeed, when construing the $1,000 personal contribution limitation in
Buckley, the Supreme Court stated that "[T]his Court has never suggested
that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money oper-
ates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny
required by the First Amendment."'' 20  As the Court found the direct ex-
penditure of funds protected by the first amendment, it is difficult to believe
that mere solicitation of such "communications," whether by the candidate
directly or by a PAC, should deserve any less protection.
The 1976 amendments too far restrict the constitutional rights of the cor-
poration to communicate. The Supreme Court has held that a corporation
has first amendment rights,' 2 ' and in United States v. CIO,12 2 the Court
117. 122 CONG. REc. H2612 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Thompson).
118. 41 Fed. Reg. at 35,959 (1976).
119. 117 CONG. REC. 43,379 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Hansen). See note 100 &
accompanying text supra, for reference to Commissioners Harris and Tiernan's argument
that solicitation is a communication.
120. 424 U.S. at 16.
121. See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). See also
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); United States v. Security Nat'l Bank, 546 F.2d
492 (2d Cir. 1976); Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974); Writers Guild
of Am., West v. FCC, No. CV75-3641-F (C.D. Cal., Nov. 4, 1976); Clagett & Bolton,
supra note 5.
122. 33.5 U.S. 106 (1948).
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implied that any statute which restricted a corporation's right to communicate
with its shareholders on political issues would cause "the gravest doubt [to]
arise in our minds as to its constitutionality." 123  The Court did not, however,
indicate whether political content in a corporate communication aimed at the
general public was protected by the first amendment.
124
The Second Circuit has been more precise in affirming the constitutional
rights of corporations. In one case the court asserted that "a corporation
• . . is a 'person' entitled to both equal protection and due process under
the Constitution .. ".. ,125 In another case involving first amendment is-
sues, it noted that "corporate contributors, . . . like individuals, are guar-
anteed freedom of speech and petition. ' 12 6  Accepting the Second Circuit's
view that a corporation is entitled to the full panoply of first amendment
rights, the conclusion follows that the corporation's right to communicate
extends to its employee contacts. But even applying the more restrictive
theory, a question remains as to the outer limits of a corporation's first
amendment rights. Freedom to communicate directly with its employees
should be considered among the most basic corporate first amendment rights.
The employer-employee relationship is a natural one in which each party has
a direct economic interest in the other. Moreover, information vital to the
employer is also vital to the employee, even if it happens that such informa-
tion is of a political nature.
Although they have the right to contribute to a PAC, members of the
"middle group" of employees who are neither union members nor "executive
or administrative personnel" could argue that their complete freedom of
speech and association is restricted by their exclusion from the group which
can be solicited without limitation. In addition, the employee has a right
123. Id. at 121. In his concurring opinion, Justice Rutledge elaborated on the cor-
poration's freedom of speech:
There are of course important legal and economic differences remaining be-
tween corporations and unincorporated associations, including labor unions,
which justify large distinctions between them in legal treatment. But to what-
ever extent this may be true, it does not follow that the broadside and blanket-
ing prohibitions here attempted in restriction of freedom of expression and as-
sembly would be valid in their corporate applications. Corporations have been
held within the First Amendment's protection against restrictions upon the
circulation of their media of expression.
Id. at 154-55.
124. Id. at 121.
125. United States v. Security Nat'l Bank, 546 F.2d 492, 494 (2d Cir. 1976) (a cor-
poration cannot be placed in "double jeopardy" for the same allegedly unlawful political
contribution).
126. Schwartz v. Romnes, 495 F.2d 844, 852 (2d Cir. 1974) (a corporation can
make political contributions in support of its interests in a bond referendum campaign).
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to information concerning the corporation's best political interests. Repre-
sentative Wiggins, one of the conferees, explicitly urged that attention be
focused on the rights of those who contribute to a PAC:
The bill mistakenly focuses upon the special interests of the
PAC's. The rights of the soliciting PAC are not to be neglected,
of course, but the rights of the donors to the PAC are of at least
equal importance. It is the right of the donor which is seriously
and unjustifiably diminished by this bill.
127
Senator Packwood introduced an unsuccessful amendment to permit both
corporate and union PAC's to solicit the "middle group" of employees, citing
their significance as comprising about half the work force of major corpora-
tions.
128
Given these first amendment rights and apparent infringements on these
rights by section 441b(b)(4)(A), it is necessary to determine whether Con-
gress has a sufficiently important interest to justify permitting the infringe-
ments, and, if so, whether the amendments provide the least restrictive
method of protecting or advancing that interest. Several rationales have
been offered for implementing such a scope of audience restriction. The
"direct interest" theory, which suggested that only shareholders and certain
employees, not easily identifiable, were closely enough related to the corpora-
tion to be solicited, is hardly a sufficient governmental interest to justify re-
stricting first amendment rights. All employees are economically dependent
upon their employers, so that no one group can accurately be said to have
a greater direct involvement than any other group. Similarly, the parity
theory, which sought to equalize the numbers of corporate and union people
solicited and the resulting contributions, provides an insubstantial govern-
mental interest.
129
127. 122 CONG. REC. E1703 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 1976).
128. Id. at S3699 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1976).
129. It is argued . . . that the ancillary governmental interest in equalizing the
relative ability of individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections
serves to justify the limitation on express advocacy of the election or defeat
of candidates imposed by § 608(e) (1 )'s expenditure ceiling. But the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources,'" and "'to assure unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people.'"
424 U.S. at 48-49, citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269
(1964), quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) and Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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Finally, the coercion theory requires maintaining confidentiality in any soli-
citation of the "middle group" and arises from the general, but secondary,
purpose of the original section 610-the protection of minority interests
within a corporation or labor organization. However, section 441b, added
by the 1976 amendments, may reach the erroneous conclusion that the
"middle group" of employees is most vulnerable to coercion. If executive
employees are actually more susceptible to the effects of coercion, however
unintentional or subtle, and if Congress deemed the three provisos given at
the time of solicitation sufficient to avoid coercion, then it is not logical to
impose even greater restrictions on solicitations of the "middle group." On
the other hand, if there is a legitimate need to protect the "middle group,"
then maintaining the confidentiality and the voluntariness of contributions
very likely provides adequate protection without also restricting the frequency
with which that group can be solicited. Under either view, adequate protec-
tion of minority interests may be accomplished with less infringement on first
amendment rights than is now imposed by the scope of the audience restric-
tions.
Leaving the subject of apparent interference with corporate rights to com-
municate and employees' rights to contribute freely to campaigns, we again
consider the most basic purpose of the federal election legislation. That goal
-more fundamental than protecting the interests of the corporate and union
minorities-is avoiding the improper influence of aggregated wealth. Ac-
cording to the rationale of Buckley v. Valeo, the contribution limitations
alone may be adequate to safeguard this congressional purpose, without any
restrictions on the scope of the solicited audience.1 3 0  In ruling on the consti-
tutionality of the $1,000 contribution limitation by individuals and groups to
candidates and authorized campaign committees,' 3 ' the Court found that the
"Act's primary purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions"-was "constitutionally
sufficient justification" to uphold the limitation.'
3 2
The Court gave some indication that the $1,000 contribution limitation
adequately safeguards the primary purpose of the Act while leaving individ-
uals free to express their political views in other ways. The Court proceeded
to discuss these alternative means without any indication that they either are
130. In finding aggregate expenditure limitations unconstitutional, the Court held
that "[a] restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by re-
stricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached." 424 U.S. at 19.
131. Those limitations are contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 608(b), 591(g), § 591(e) (Supp.
V 1975).
132. 424 U.S. at 26.
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or should be restricted beyond the contribution limitation in order to carry
out the legislative purpose.
13
Two possibly contradictory meanings can be derived from the Court's dis-
cussion of alternative means of political expression and the separate segre-
gated fund. First, because the separate segregated fund exception was not
at issue, the Court chose not to comment on it directly, but rather expressed
veiled concerns about its use as a means of subverting the primary aim of
the Act-"to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from
large individual financial contributions."'1 34  If the Court were taking the
position that the separate segregated fund exception ultimately reinjects the
appearance of aggregated wealth into federal elections, when confronted with
the issue, the Court would likely uphold certain "closely drawn" means of
limiting the deleterious effects of the separate segregated fund. On the other
hand, the Court may think that the primary purpose of the Act is sufficiently
protected by the contribution limitation, so that the alternative means are
freely available to corporations or labor organizations.
There are strong suggestions that the Court intended the first alternative.
It expressly noted that the problem of large campaign contributions was "the
narrow aspect of political association where the actuality and potential for
corruption have been identified."'1 5  Perhaps the Court anticipates or ac-
knowledges that other aspects of political association either will become, or
already are, sources of corruption, which somehow had escaped legislative
133. Id. at 28-29. The Court went even further, and in a footnote elaborated on the
type of political expression left open to individuals:
While providing significant limitations on the ability of all individuals and
groups to contribute large amounts of money to candidates, the Act's contribu-
tion ceilings do not foreclose the making of substantial contributions to can-
didates by some major special interest groups through the combined effect of
individual contributions from adherents or the proliferation of political funds
each authorized under the Act to contribute to candidates. As a prime ex-
ample, § 610 permits corporations and labor unions to establish segregated
funds to solicit voluntary contributions to be utilized for political purposes.
Corporate and union resources withouit limitation may be employed to ad-
minister these funds and to solicit contributions from employees, stockholders,
and union members. Each separate fund may contribute up to $5,000 per can-
didate per election so long as the fund qualifies as a political committee under
§ 608(b) (2).
Id. at 28 n.31, citing S. REP. No. 93-1237, at 50-52 (1974); Federal Election Com-
mission Advisory Opinion 1975-23 (Nov. 24, 1975), 40 Fed. Reg. 56,584 (1975). The
1976 amendments' anti-proliferation provision has, of course, limited the contributions
from related PAC's to a single candidate to a total of $5,000. See note 44 & accom-
panying text supra.
134. Id. at 26.
135. Id. at 28.
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sanction and were not then before the Court for adjudication. If so, it may
have issued a forewarning against the potential undermining of the Act's pur-
pose as a result of "substantial contributions to candidates by some major
special interest groups through . . . the proliferation of political funds."'
'1'
But the 1976 amendments may have forestalled any possibility of such an
undermining through the anti-proliferation provision. Section 441a(a)(5)
now curtails the vertical proliferation of contributions by political commit-
tees by treating certain labor or corporate political committees as one for
contribution purposes.
1 37
The sound conclusion appears to be that the Court will find the contribu-
tion limitations adequate of themselves, without further particular restrictions
on political funds, particularly in light of the anti-proliferation provision.
One could argue that vast sums of money will be spent in establishing, ad-
ministering, and soliciting contributions to corporate and union funds. Very
likely that will be so. However, money spent in that way is not a direct
contribution and is expressly permitted by the 1976 amendments.
Without impermissibly restricting the first amendment rights of either the
corporate PAC managers, the corporation itself, or the employees and share-
holders who would be solicited, the contribution limitation adequately assures
that elections will not be corrupted by the effects of aggregated wealth. This,
combined with such safeguards against coercion as the statutory provisos, ap-
pears to reach an acceptable balance between first amendment rights and
legitimate governmental interests. The solicitation provisions, however, fail
to contribute to that balance because of the excessive first amendment
restrictions discussed earlier.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps because federal election legislation is so close to the heart of
Congress, there has been little dispassionate debate in this area. The subject
of corporate and union political action committees has understandably gen-
erated particularly partisan responses. As a result, the Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 were not drafted with complete objec-
tivity and may be subject to constitutional challenge. Drafting carefully
reasoned federal election legislation is obviously a difficult task. In structur-
ing and regulating PAC's, Congress has for the most part performed its
duties well, except with respect to the scope of audience restrictions. One
136. Id. at 28 n.31.
137. 2 U.S.C.A. § 441a(a)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
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effect of these particular provisions contrary to basic democratic principles
is to stifle participation in the electoral process.
138
In his dissenting opinion in United States v. UAW,"19 Justice Douglas
addressed what is perhaps the crucial factor in corporate and union political
action committee legislation:
Some may think that one group or another should not express
its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it advo-
cates unpopular ideas, or because it has a record of lawless action.
But these are not justifications for withholding First Amendment
rights from any group-labor or corporate.
140
Congress has not yet addressed the issue from a similar vantage point. Un-
til it does, it is, in effect, allowing first amendment rights of participation in
the electoral process to be sacrificed to the haste, passion, or carelessness of
the legislative process.
Diane V. Brown
138. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REc. H2539 (daily ed. Mar. 30, 1976).
The whole purpose in political action committees is to allow persons with
like philosophical and/or economic interests to band together and to promote
those interests through a political action committee. This is participation in
our political system and certainly any participation in politics should be en-
couraged and not hindered. Our democracy needs greater, not less, par-
ticipation by our citizenry. Political action committees can be justified only
on this basis. They currently meet this need by encouraging citizens by the
thousands to become more politically active. There should be no "political"
hindrances on who can join and participate in such committees (emphasis
added).
Id. at H2539-40 (Remarks of Rep. Moore).
139. 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
140. Id. at 597.
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